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Abstract
This paper discusses coalition formation with side payments in markets for trans-
ferable property rights where strategic agents prevail on both sides of the market.
Our concern is emissions permit trading under the Kyoto Protocol. While a seller
cartel is not pro￿table, our analysis indicates that coalitions between sellers and
buyers pay o⁄. Three stable cartels are found. None involve all agents, yet they all
induce overall e¢ ciency. To support a stable coalition, the EU, Japan and Canada
may pay together between 0 and 13 billion US dollars per year to Russia. The
permit price and society-wide emission reductions are nil.
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ity.
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1 Introduction
As a response to the problem of global warming, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, now in force,
was hammered out to limit emissions of greenhouse gases in the period 2008￿ 2012. Parties
to that agreement are the governments of some industrialized countries that have a well-
de￿ned endowment of pollution rights. Since Parties may comply via emissions trade
(Article 17), a permit market is likely to emerge.
If the number of participants in such a market is large, perfect competition ￿ la Mont-
gomery (1972) may prevail. For the Kyoto Protocol, this assumption appears somewhat
optimistic. Moreover, the initial distribution of endowments is skewed compared to cor-
responding needs. These features create incentives for agents on both sides of the market
to act strategically. Following Hahn (1984) and Westskog (1996), this calls for Parties to
be modeled as price-a⁄ecting. More speci￿cally, we posit a scenario where some agents
constitute a price-taking (market-clearing) fringe, while others are strategists, taking into
account how their own choices a⁄ect the price.
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1Given such a setting, we ask: What if some strategically aware Parties form a cartel
and coordinate actions against outsiders? Who might ￿nd it interesting to participate in
such a cartel, and how will prices and abatement costs be a⁄ected?
These issues appear relevant for the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC (1997)) since there
seem to be no formal hurdles to such syndication. On the contrary, Article 3 states that
Parties may cooperate, and compliance is then evaluated against a total, rather than a
country-speci￿c, emissions target. The secretariat of the Protocol must be noti￿ed of
such arrangements upon rati￿cation (Article 4), and this is exactly what the EU did on
behalf of its 15 member states, prior to the May 2004 extension (abbreviated as EU15).
However, Parties are allowed to exchange permits, and cooperation is therefore not limited
by the noti￿cation clause, since it is possible to exchange permits and preserve individual
compliance for all cooperating Parties. Such joint actions are what we have in mind for
the coalitions we will study.
When making predictions about the impact of the Kyoto Protocol in terms of permit
prices and abatement costs for the Parties involved, previous studies have either relied
on price-taking behavior or limited the discussion of strategic behavior to the seller side
of the market. In the latter context, monopolizing supply is pro￿table and may have a
large e⁄ect on prices and costs. For a survey of the literature, see Springer (2003). We
use predictions about emissions and costs in the year 2010 derived from the MERGE
model developed by A. S. Manne and R. G. Richels (see for instance Manne and Richels
(1992, 2004)) and disaggregate the data to country levels. Using these data, we show
that neglecting strategic behavior on the buyer side rules out an important issue: large
buyers can restrict purchases to push permit prices down, just as strategic sellers may
restrict sales to induce the opposite e⁄ect. This has important consequences for coalition
pro￿tability, which depends on the size of the cost savings for those who collude, and
the strategic e⁄ect from outsiders. More speci￿cally, when sellers form coalitions, our
numerical analysis shows that the strategic e⁄ect is negative and the internal cost savings
are nil. Hence, cooperation between sellers is unpro￿table. This is even true with full
monopolization on the supply side.1 With the exception of one case, the same result
applies when strategic buyers cooperate, but here cost savings come into e⁄ect. Mergers
between two agents that show up on di⁄erent sides of the market, are always pro￿table
since cost savings are then larger and dominate any negative strategic e⁄ects.
Going beyond exogenous coalition structures, we also make some tentative suggestions
about what may be likely equilibrium cartels and the corresponding prices and costs. Our
analysis suggests that a coalition between the EU15, Russia, Canada, Japan and either
Poland or the Ukraine is stable. We make a ballpark estimate of the possible transfers
that may occur between these Parties. While it is possible that Russia may get nothing,
we calculate a maximum total transfer level of 13 billion US$ per year, coming from the
EU15, Japan and Canada. In total, the EU15 has a maximum payment level (willingness
to pay) of 14 billion US$ per year, while the corresponding amounts for Japan and Canada
are 6.5 and 0.5 billion US$ per year, respectively. We think that these numbers give a
guide to the relative bargaining strengths of the Parties and the actual transfer levels that
1Godal et al. (2006) discuss similar issues in a more general framework, focusing on the negative
strategic e⁄ects of mergers.
2could result if e¢ cient coalitions are formed under the Kyoto Protocol. Interestingly, if
the EU can persuade their new member countries to let the EU act on their behalf, and
this is common knowledge, the EU improves its position at the expense of Japan and
Canada. In essence, if the enlarged EU (EU25) can count on the goodwill of its newest
members, it is far less dependent upon the formation of the equilibrium coalitions, which
leaves much more of the burden of inducing Russia to join on the shoulders of Japan and
Canada. Of course, while seeming like a wholesome EU idea, this raises important issues
about intra-EU cooperation and transfers to the newest members of the EU.
We organize things as follows. In section 2 we present the game, which for convenience
assumes three stages: the coalition formation game, the strategic exchange game, and
the pricing of permits (degenerate) game. Section 3 then discusses the parameters of the
model and describes the perfectly competitive outcome. The main contribution of the
paper is in section 4, where the results of the numerical analysis are presented. We begin
there with the benchmark noncooperative case, and then look at exogenous ￿mergers￿
in order to understand some of the driving forces in the model. Subsequently we discuss
stable coalitions and the distribution of income within these coalitions. An extension
concerning the enlargement of the EU and the e⁄ect of the so-called commitment period
reserve rule, which places limits on sales, appears at the end. Section 5 summarizes and
contains some ￿nal remarks.
2 The model
Throughout, there is a ￿xed and ￿nite set I of agents who comprise the signatories of the
Kyoto agreement. They set out to keep aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide-equivalent
emissions within speci￿c limits. Agent i 2 I is endowed with ei permits to pollute.
Besides being transferable, permits are assumed homogeneous, perfectly divisible and
nonstorable. Each agent decides to keep the amount xi ￿ 0 for themselves, thereby
incurring nonnegative, decreasing, convex and continuously di⁄erentiable emission costs
ci (xi).2 The residual ei ￿ xi is exchanged in a common market at unit price p ￿ 0.
Following the setup for strategic trade of Hahn (1984) and Westskog (1996), we posit
a mixed scenario with two types of agents. Some are ￿small￿ ; they behave as price-takers
and belong to a nonempty fringe named F. Others are ￿large￿ ; they are strategists
(oligopolists or oligopsonists) and belong to a set S. Thus, I is the disjoint union of
S and F. Since our focus is on coalitions between large agents, we shall only allow
strategists to take part in the coalition formation game.
It is convenient to represent the overall game as if there were three stages. First, each
i 2 S decides whether or not they want to join the coalition C ￿ S. Second, all i 2 S
decide simultaneously how many permits they want to keep. Members of a coalition
minimize joint costs and compete in a noncooperative fashion against the nonmember
strategists, if any. Third, price-takers allocate remaining permits via perfect competition,
thereby de￿ning the equilibrium market clearing price.
2It is convenient and commonplace in the literature to assume that the cost functions satisfy c0
i < 0
and c00
i > 0. However, our parameters do not satisfy these properties. The main reason is that some
players, most notably Russia, are endowed with more permits than needed.




















where xF is the allocation (xi)i2F: The permit price p comes as a Lagrange multiplier
(shadow price) associated with the constraint in (1). Observe that among the ￿rst-order
conditions of problem (1) is
￿c
0
i (xi) = p;
meaning that marginal abatement costs will equal the permit price. This re￿ ects (per-
fectly) competitive behavior.3
Since the permit price p will depend on Q, we write Q 7! P (Q). The members of
the coalition C; which at this second stage has already formed, cannot do better than
incurring total costs4
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ci (xi) + P(eI ￿ xS￿fig ￿ xi)(xi ￿ ei)
￿
: (3)
There are externalities in this model, since all strategists recognize and account for the
fact that p depends on Q.5
The speci￿cation of the two last stages is now complete, and we turn to the coalition
formation game. For games of that sort, many solution concepts are available. What
we need is one that allows for the presence of positive and negative externalities; that
does not rely on reduced costs that are subadditive across players;6 and, since we want
to quantify things, it should be computationally feasible.
To these ends, we follow d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983) by allowing the formation of only
one coalition. Our focus will be on coalitions between large, price-a⁄ecting agents, where
3It also re￿ ects the competitive element of a cooperative market game in characteristic function form
￿ la Shapley and Shubik (1969) ￿guring player set F. That game has a nonempty core governed by
shadow prices (see Evstigneev and Fl￿m (2001)). Adopting this alternative cooperative framework is
possible. The case when S is empty, i.e. F = I; is included in our numerical analysis and its main
characteristics are reported in Table 1 of section 3.




5Appendix B gives details about the method used to ￿nd equilibria of the second-stage game.
6That is, superadditive reduced payo⁄s, which refers to a situation where a coalition can achieve at
least as much as its members can achieve individually.
4side payments may occur, but only between agents who cooperate.7 More speci￿cally,
our main interest is in a coalition C that satis￿es the following properties:
De￿nition (coalitional stability) A nonempty coalition C is stable if and only if it sat-
is￿es
Internal stability: CC (￿) ￿ CC￿fig (￿) + Ci (￿) for all i 2 C; and
External stability: CC[fig (￿) ￿ CC (￿) + Ci (￿) for all i 2 S￿C; if any. ￿
Internal stability means that the coalition incurs lower costs as a whole, than if a mem-
ber dropped out, adding the costs this agent would incur alone. A coalition is externally
stable if the total costs of the coalition, by including a new member, are larger than the
costs of the coalition without this new member, adding the costs this agent would get on
its own.
Those readers who are at ease with the overall game being well de￿ned, may immediately
jump to section 3.
To determine whether any given coalition structure is stable or not, precisely one
equilibrium should exist in the second-stage noncooperative game. From a general point
of view, it is well established that games of the second-stage sort have at least one equi-
librium if strategy sets are nonempty, compact and convex, and the objective functions
in (2) and (3) are jointly continuous and convex in the decision variable. All these (suf-
￿cient) conditions are satis￿ed in our set-up, except for one, namely that nonconvexities
cannot be ruled out in the objective functions. The problems arise in the market expenses
(or revenues), i.e., in the object P (￿;xi)(xi ￿ ei). Although, as shown in Appendix B,
P is nonincreasing in Q; its curvature properties could, in principle, be anything. Fur-
thermore, since the sign of xi ￿ei is endogenously determined and varies between agents
(buyers versus sellers), overall nonconvexities seem like a realistic scenario. Possible reme-
dies to guarantee existence include subscribing to randomized strategies or relaxing the
hypothesis of rational expectations (Fl￿m and Godal (2005)).
With the parameters that will be used below, equilibria exist. However, uniqueness is
not always attained. This is not too worrisome since the equilibria di⁄er only in allocation
and not in value (payo⁄ or cost).
7Even though we adopt the notion of stability used by d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983), our underlying
model of trade di⁄ers. First, and as in Veendorp (1993), there are strategic agents on both sides of
the market, not merely on the supply side. Second, it is endogenously determined on which side of
the market an agent appears. Third, the price curve is endogenous, and it will be constructed from
a nonempty fringe. Fourth, this curve is not strictly decreasing, nor continuously di⁄erentiable on the
relevant domain. Finally, we shall suppose that strategic agents outside the coalition do not join the
fringe, but still use whatever market power they have. Another solution concept that is applicable
but more computationally demanding, is that of Horn and Persson (2001), which allows for multiple
coalitions. A recent comprehensive survey of coalitional games with externalities, the so-called partition
function approach as introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963), is given in Carraro (2003). McMillan (1986)
summarizes some facts from the history of international cartels.
53 Parameterization of the model
To quantify the potential importance of cartel formations, emission cost functions were
derived from the MERGE model developed by A. S. Manne and R. G. Richels (1992,
2004), and then disaggregated to country levels. Appendix A gives the details.8 What is
worth mentioning here is how we have treated the countries of the EU.
The EU15 have made use of Article 3 in the Protocol to comply together. However,
according to Article 4, paragraph 4: ￿If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework
of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization, any alteration in the
composition of the organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not a⁄ect existing
commitments under this Protocol....￿It therefore appears most likely that the new EU
member countries will not be included in the already existing EU15 agreement. On this
basis, we shall ￿rst model the EU as a single agent comprising its members prior to the
May 2004 extension. How the results change should the enlarged EU come forward as a
single agent, is discussed towards the end of the next section.
Having followed the framework for strategic trade in Hahn (1984) and Westskog
(1996), what remains, to have a complete speci￿cation of the model, is to classify agents
into strategists and price-takers. We are not aware of any guidance on how this choice
should be made. What we do is to use a simulation of the perfectly competitive equilib-
rium to identify agents with a potential dominant position in this market. The results
are as follows.9
8As discussed there, the reader should not put too much emphasis on the results for countries that
have small emissions.
9Throughout, the following abbreviations are used: M-million, B-billion, t-metric ton, C-carbon,
US$-US dollars of 1997, and yr-year. The number ^ xi is the ￿business-as-usual￿emissions level (B-a-u
for short), which is what agent i 2 I would have emitted in the absence of any restrictions. M-a-c is the
marginal cost of reducing emissions, that is, the ￿marginal abatement cost￿ , while M-s is the ￿market
share￿ .
6Table 1. Perfectly competitive permit trading under the Kyoto Protocol.
Endowment Kept B-a-u M-a-c Exchanged M-s
Symbol ei xi ^ xi ￿c0
i(xi) xi ￿ ei ￿i
Units MtC/yr MtC/yr MtC/yr US$/tC MtC/yr
Russia 768 555 516 0 ￿213 ￿63%
EU15 839 1011 1011 0 172 51%
Japan 258 351 351 0 93 28%
Canada 123 189 189 0 66 20%
Ukraine 228 192 153 0 ￿36 ￿11%
Poland 116 83 83 0 ￿33 ￿10%
Czech Rep. 51 36 36 0 ￿15 ￿4%
Romania 51 38 38 0 ￿14 ￿4%
Bulgaria 25 18 18 0 ￿7 ￿2%
Hungary 22 16 16 0 ￿6 ￿2%
Slovakia 19 14 14 0 ￿5 ￿1%
Lithuania 12 9 9 0 ￿3 ￿1%
New Zealand 7 10 10 0 3 1%
Estonia 11 8 8 0 ￿3 ￿1%
Switzerland 11 14 14 0 2 1%
Latvia 7 5 5 0 ￿2 ￿1%
Slovenia 4 3 3 0 ￿1 0%
Norway 10 11 11 0 1 0%
Iceland 1 1 1 0 0 0%
Total 2563 2563 2485
Note that aggregate projected emissions without emission reductions (given in column
￿B-a-u￿ ) are smaller than total endowments. Thus, there is a surplus of permits available
in total (and the permit price is therefore nil). This may be explained by the economic
collapse of the countries of the former Soviet Union (most notably Russia), which are
not expecting a full emissions recovery in the projected period (2008￿ 2012). The results
compare well with other studies (see, e.g., Springer (2003)), which have projected an
aggregate surplus or a very modest shortage of permits without the participation of the
US.
Each agent￿ s market share ￿i; given in the rightmost column of Table 1, is de￿ned as
(xi ￿ ei)=V with V := 1
2
P
i2I jxi ￿ eij being the volume of the permit market. Thus, a
positive (negative) ￿i signi￿es that the agent comes forward as a buyer (seller) of permits,
and market shares add up to 100% for the buyers and ￿ 100% for the sellers. The rows in
Table 1 have been sorted according to the absolute value of the market shares. Hence, the
dominant agent in the market is Russia, which contributes with almost two-thirds of its
total permit supply. The second-largest agent is the EU15, purchasing about half of all
permits bought, etc. These market shares are not unique, however, since the surplus of
permits available can be distributed in a continuum of ways. The span in market shares
7that supports equilibrium is nevertheless not substantial.10
Table 1 indicates that strategic permit trading indeed appears to be a relevant feature
due to the presence of large agents. But who should be modeled as strategists? Russia
and the EU15 only? Japan? A line must be drawn somewhere, and when doing so, there
appears to be a trade-o⁄between assuming relatively large agents to be price-takers, and
to have a fringe that is very small.
We shall assume, quite arbitrarily, that countries that make up at least 10% of to-
tal sales or purchases in the perfectly competitive equilibrium depicted above, will act
strategically. Even though the above equilibrium is not unique, these Parties also have
the largest excess or lack of permits relative to an average level, making them the Parties
with the highest stakes in the market.11 There are then six strategists: Russia, Ukraine,
Poland, the EU15, Japan and Canada. The other countries constitute the fringe in our
model. With this split, we have what appears to be three strategists on each side of the
market. Even though, in principle, there could be situations where one of these agents,
in some equilibrium, came forward on the ￿other￿side of the market, this never happens
in our simulations. Thus, the strategic agents can safely be categorized as sellers (Russia,
Ukraine and Poland) and buyers (EU15, Japan and Canada).12 The fringe will be a net
seller of quotas in our setting.
4 Numerical analysis
The numerical analysis was carried out by ￿xing the membership of a ￿rst-stage coali-
tion and then solving the second-stage game. How the model was solved numerically is
discussed in Appendix B.
In this section, we start o⁄ with the benchmark case with an empty coalition. Sub-
sequently, we will discuss several exogenous coalition structures, foremost to gain an
understanding of the key driving forces and to compare with the literature on Cournot
mergers. The endogenously determined stable coalitions appear towards the end, followed
by notes on the commitment period reserve rule and the enlarged EU. In the interest of
parsimony, the fringe countries are presented as a single player.
4.1 The benchmark case
With an empty coalition, the characteristics of the noncooperative equilibrium of the
model are given in Table 2.
10In calculating the market shares, we have assumed that Russia and the Ukraine are keeping all excess
quotas. Thus, their market shares are at comparatively low levels, while other sellers are at their ￿peak￿
market shares. This also explains the di⁄erence between kept levels in the second column and the B-a-u
levels.
11Their B-a-u levels minus their endowments are furthest from the average of this measure across all
parties.
12Choosing a cuto⁄that leaves a minimum of three strategic agents on both sides of the market also has
advantages in relation to discussing coalition pro￿tability, since we can then discuss two-party coalitions
that do not lead to a full concentration (on one side of the market).
8Table 2. Imperfect competition without coalitions under the Kyoto Protocol.
Used M-a-c Exchange Costs
Symbol xi ￿c0
i (xi) xi ￿ ei Ci
Unit MtC/yr US$/tC MtC/yr BUS$/yr
Russia 761 0 ￿7 ￿0:4
Ukraine 221 0 ￿7 ￿0:4
Poland 109 0 ￿7 ￿0:4
EU15 867 267 28 20:7
Japan 290 298 32 10:8
Canada 140 181 17 5:4
Fringe 175 53 ￿56 ￿2:8
Total 2563 0 32:9
When comparing with the perfectly competitive outcome, the ￿gures in Table 2 show
that supply of permits into the market is restricted by the strategic sellers, and the
permit price jumps from 0 to 53 US$/tC (the marginal abatement cost of the fringe).
Total costs (a negative measure of welfare) increase by nearly 33 BUS$/yr, indicating
that oligopolistic behavior has the power to signi￿cantly reduce overall welfare. Another
reason total costs soar (which incidentally also prevents an even higher price) is that the
strategic buyers restrict purchases relative to the competitive scenario.
On the up-side, this type of behavior also yields some emission reductions that we did
not have under perfect competition. Any bene￿ts in terms of a better climate are not
accounted for in our measure of welfare.
4.2 Exogenous coalitions
We start by discussing coalitions where ￿similar￿Parties are involved.
4.2.1 Mergers between sellers
In the literature on strategic permit supply under the Kyoto Protocol, countries of the
former Soviet Union are often treated as a single agent, Russia and the Ukraine being
the two most important members (see, for example, Manne and Richels (2004) and the
overview by Springer (2003)). Table 3 sheds some light on the pro￿tability of such coor-
dinated strategic supply, given the presence of strategic buyers.13
13Tables 3 to 5 should be read in the following manner. The ￿rst row assigns to each column a reference
number for later use. Columns with identical reference numbers represent the same simulations. In the
row below, the equilibrium price is given. All other ￿gures are total costs, including revenues/expenses
from permit trade. Each column shows the distribution of costs given a particular coalition. An ￿
indicates membership of the coalition or cartel, and total costs for those members are given in the second
row. The ￿rst column gives the reference coalition structure. The last row then shows the cost increment
for the members of the cartel as compared to their aggregate costs in the reference column. Hence, a
positive number in the last row indicates that the cartel is unpro￿table compared to the reference ￿gures.
9Table 3. Cartels with strategic sellers. The permit price is given in US$/tC. All other ￿g-
ures are total costs measured in BUS$/yr.
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Price 53 64 64 64 79
Cartel ￿0:5 ￿0:5 ￿0:5 ￿0:8
Russia ￿0:4 ￿ ￿ ￿0:5 ￿
Ukraine ￿0:4 ￿ ￿0:5 ￿ ￿
Poland ￿0:4 ￿0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿
EU15 20:7 21:2 21:2 21:2 21:9
Japan 10:8 11:3 11:3 11:3 12:1
Canada 5:4 5:7 5:7 5:7 6:1
Fringe ￿2:8 ￿3:4 ￿3:4 ￿3:4 ￿4:3
Total 32:9 34:2 34:2 34:2 35:7
Cost incr. cartel 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:3
We see that for two-country seller cartels (#2, #3 and #4), the members lose about
200 MUS$/yr as compared to the no-cartel case, while the ￿outside￿strategic seller wins
some 100 MUS$/yr. The strategic buyers all lose. The ￿gures are identical no matter
which two countries form a cartel. This is because, in all cases, the sellers have zero mar-
ginal costs in equilibrium, and consequently it does not matter which countries cooperate
even though their size and surplus of quotas di⁄er.
These results are clearly reminiscent of the traditional merger results (Salant et al.
(1983)) and follow the usual intuition that the outside strategic agent on the same side
of the market as those that merge, has fewer competitors after a merger. In a Cournot
setting, this leads to an expansion of that agent￿ s output at the expense of the merging
￿rms￿market shares.14 While our results may not seem very surprising in light of this, it
is notable that they still prevail with strategic agents on both sides of the market.
The results from the merger literature also suggest that, while a merger between any
two sellers may not be bene￿cial, a merger involving all three agents, should be so. Our
results (case #5) do not follow the classic model here, since it turns out that such a merger
is not pro￿table (the concentration is still not su¢ cient). It may seem strange that the
sellers do not win from such a ￿monopolization￿ . The reason for this is that, while they
restrict sales to push up prices, the buyers￿equilibrium response is to restrict purchases
further.15 It follows that the buyers will also lose from such a cartel. The price-takers in
this particular example win on average, because of the abundance of quotas among these
14It is worth noting that the Salant et al. results may be reversed under Bertrand competition.
However, we would argue that modeling a framework like this as a Bertrand game would be less realistic
due to the fact that restricting capacity (which is something at least the well-endowed countries can
credibly do without threat of being driven out of the market) is exactly the way to resurrect the Cournot
model from a Bertrand setting (see Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)).
15It may be argued that since the fringe is a supplier of permits, the coalition does not involve all
sellers. However, this is not the reason for the above result, which is further discussed in Godal et al.
(2006). The results from the next section illustrate this. There, it is shown that a buyer ￿monopsony￿
is also unpro￿table. This holds even though there are sizable cost savings in that case.
10agents.
In conclusion, then, one may argue that the above results cast some doubts on lumping
Russia, the Ukraine and other sellers together as if they were to form a cartel. The reason
monopolization is pro￿table in studies that do this, is because the demand side is assumed
to be price-taking.16
4.2.2 Mergers between buyers
With coalitions on the demand side, the same qualitative results prevail as was the case
for sellers. This is clear from Table 4.
Table 4. Cartels with strategic buyers. Units as in Table 3.
#1 #6 #7 #8 #9
Price 53 17 28 26 0
Cartel 35:3 27:5 17:9 39:1
Russia ￿0:4 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿0:1 0:0
Ukraine ￿0:4 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿0:1 0:0
Poland ￿0:4 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿0:1 0:0
EU15 20:7 ￿ ￿ 19:2 ￿
Japan 10:8 ￿ 9:4 ￿ ￿
Canada 5:4 4:2 ￿ ￿ ￿
Fringe ￿2:8 ￿0:8 ￿1:5 ￿1:3 0:0
Total 32:9 38:6 35:2 35:5 39:1
Cost incr. cartel 3:9 1:5 1:7 2:3
Observe that the price is zero in what may be dubbed a ￿monopsony￿(case #9 where
all three strategic buyers form a cartel). This may seem surprising since the cartel incurs
substantial costs. However, it cannot reap the full bene￿ts of a price of zero, since that
would increase prices. Thus, the cartel simply empties the fringe of excess quotas at a
price of zero, taking care not to increase purchases above this level, which would induce
a positive price on all purchased quotas. The sellers are obviously adversely a⁄ected by
such a low price.17 Comparing with the results under a three-seller cartel, the fact that
the price-takers lose is straightforward: they won in that case because they are relatively
well endowed as a whole, and they lose (as a whole) now for exactly the same reason.
A lesson to be learned from case #9, is that, while the competitive equilibrium is
e¢ cient (with a price equal to zero), observing such a price in no way signals an e¢ cient
16Assuming only the three sellers to be strategists, coalitions between Russia and the Ukraine, Russia
and Poland and between all three strategists, all turn out to be bene￿cial. A coalition between Poland and
the Ukraine is not. In all two-party cases, however, the outside strategist earns more than the merging
parties, which means that the merger paradox (Salant et al. (1983)) prevails under these circumstances.
17Ceteris paribus, the sellers would be equally well o⁄ by dumping their excess quotas on the market,
but if the buyers were to purchase these quotas, it would be better for the sellers to restrict output,
increasing the price above zero. Thus, there is no Nash equilibrium where the strategic sellers dump
excess quotas on the market at a price of zero.
11(competitive) permit allocation.18 The permit allocation is so ine¢ cient that aggregate
costs may be some 39 BUS$/yr above the costs in the competitive equilibrium. ￿Fortu-
nately￿though, this turns out to be an unstable coalition.
4.2.3 Merger between a buyer and a seller
So far we have shown that cartels formed between the large agents on either side of the
market seem to be an unlikely occurrence since they simply do not pay o⁄. The next
step is then to check for cartels between agents that tend to come forward on di⁄erent
sides of the market.
Looking at two-country situations only, the nine possible cartel combinations produce
outcomes as given in Table 5.
Table 5. Cartels with a strategic seller and a strategic buyer. Units as in Table 3.
#1 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18
Price 53 13 8 29 37 17 29 50 38 45
Cartel 0:0 0:0 ￿0:1 6:0 0:4 ￿0:1 12:9 4:2 1:4
Russia ￿0:4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:2 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿0:3 ￿0:2 ￿0:3
Ukraine ￿0:4 0:0 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0:3 ￿0:2 ￿0:3
Poland ￿0:4 0:0 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿0:2 0:0 ￿0:1 ￿ ￿ ￿
EU15 20:7 ￿ 18:2 19:4 ￿ 18:7 19:4 ￿ 19:9 20:2
Japan 10:8 8:5 ￿ 9:5 9:9 ￿ 9:5 10:6 ￿ 10:3
Canada 5:4 4:1 4:0 ￿ 4:9 4:2 ￿ 5:3 4:9 ￿
Fringe ￿2:8 ￿0:6 ￿0:4 ￿1:5 ￿1:9 ￿0:8 ￿1:5 ￿2:7 ￿2:0 ￿2:4
Total 32:9 12:0 21:7 27:0 18:5 22:4 27:0 25:4 26:6 29:1
Cost incr. cartel ￿20:3 ￿10:4 ￿5:1 ￿14:3 ￿10:0 ￿5:1 ￿7:4 ￿6:2 ￿3:6
Not surprisingly, all cartels are now pro￿table. The nonmember strategists either win, or
lose much less than they gain from the cartel formation, and the total e⁄ect on welfare
is positive, i.e., total costs go down. Most gains are available for Russia and the EU15,
where total costs for the two decrease by 20 BUS$/yr. Together, a seller and a buyer can
avoid the common tragedy of holding back on supply and demand (to induce a price in-
crease and decrease, respectively). Outside strategists never win as much as the coalition
partners.
4.3 Stable coalitions
Having explored the driving forces in the model, we now turn to the stable coalitions.
These are given in Table 6.19
18This is qualitatively the same as Veendorp (1987, p. 525) ￿nds in a (symmetric) model with strategic
buyers and sellers.
19One way to ￿nd the stable coalitions is to add sequentially the nonmember agents that could con-
tribute with the largest cost savings to the already existing coalition. Starting o⁄ with EU and Russia
(cf., Tables 3￿ 5), one would, following this procedure, continue with Japan and then Canada. When
12Table 6. Stable coalitions. Units as in Table 3.
#19 #20 #21
Price 0 0 0
Cartel 0:00 0:00 0:00
Russia ￿ ￿ ￿
Ukraine ￿ 0:00 ￿
Poland 0:00 ￿ ￿
EU15 ￿ ￿ ￿
Japan ￿ ￿ ￿
Canada ￿ ￿ ￿
Fringe 0:00 0:00 0:00
Total 0:00 0:00 0:00
In all three stable coalition structures, the permit price is nil, and there are no emis-
sion reductions.20 Since no other combination of countries has been found to give these
results, we also argue that these are the only stable coalitions. From a welfare point of
view, the overall outcome with a stable coalition does not di⁄er from the perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium, even though not all agents are taking part in the coalition. These
results are dependent upon the fact that the price-takers are net suppliers. If the price-
takers were buyers, strategists could try to monopolize on this ￿exogenous￿ demand.
However, with the fringe having enough permits to satisfy their B-a-u levels, the best a
coalition could do is to achieve zero net costs. The grand coalition has enough permits
to do this entirely on its own. The coalition without Poland needs 4 MtC/yr from the
fringe to achieve zero costs, while the coalition without the Ukraine needs 46 MtC/yr
(the excess permits of the fringe amount to 49 MtC/yr).
Some points about the stable structures found above deserve mentioning. First of
all, reasonable alternative assumptions about who are strategists do not change the basic
result that any equilibrium coalition would have zero costs and cannot exploit the fringe;
letting one or more of the sellers (the most relevant one being Poland) be a price-taker
only increases the excess supply of the fringe. Letting, for instance, Canada be a price-
taker changes matters, but it seems unwarranted to exclude Canada without at least also
excluding Poland. In that case, the price-takers are still net suppliers. Adding some of
the price-takers as strategists reduces the excess permits of the fringe, but moving down
Table 1 it is easy to see that the fringe would, at the maximum, buy a marginal amount.
We would have to include another six strategists before the fringe even stops being a
net supplier, and even then the fringe only lacks approximately 1 MtC/yr to induce zero
costs.
Second, we do not believe that the use of other reasonable coalition stability con-
subsequently adding either Poland or the Ukraine, or both, the coalition becomes both internally and
externally stable.
20As discussed in Appendix B, there are multiple equilibria in all these cases. This is a result of
di⁄erences in the distribution of excess quotas, which do not a⁄ect reduced costs.
13cepts will change what constitutes the stable coalitions here. Since, as argued above,
exploitation of the fringe is practically impossible and the minimum cost option for all
strategists is available, we ￿nd it reasonable that a stable coalition should imply zero
costs across the board. The framework of Horn and Persson (2001), for instance, allows
for multiple coalitions. In the grand coalition, all players are what Horn and Persson dub
￿decisive￿ . In accordance with their solution concept, it su¢ ces to compare total costs in
the grand coalition to all other coalition structures. However, since the grand coalition
by construction minimizes joint costs, it will have at least as low costs as every other
coalition structure. Thus it is an equilibrium. In the two other stable coalition struc-
tures that we found, the outside Parties (the Ukraine or Poland) may not be decisive.
However, even though transfers between coalitions may not be allowed, the fact that the
Ukraine or Poland may not be decisive can only strengthen the conclusion: neither the
Ukraine nor Poland can possibly do worse than obtaining net costs of zero. Thus, if they
are not decisive, there is never a potential loss that is not accounted for by the decisive
owners. Since the stable coalitions minimize aggregate costs, there is no possibility that
any other coalition (or, indeed, set of coalitions) can be strictly better for the decisive
owners. Thus, all three stable coalition structures are equilibria under the Horn￿ Persson
framework.
Based on the above discussion and results, any stable coalition will involve zero costs
for all involved Parties as a whole. However, side payments may come into play to secure
participation of vital players. To quantify the importance of such considerations, we shall
discuss what each agent is willing to pay to join the coalition, as well as what all other
coalition partners are willing to pay for each agent￿ s membership. The ￿gures are given
in the left and right subcolumns, respectively, in Table 7.
Table 7. Total costs of exit from a stable coalition by each country. Units as in Table 3
and ￿n.a.￿means not applicable.
Equilibrium structure as in #19 #20 #21
Symbol Ci CC￿fig Ci CC￿fig Ci CC￿fig
Russia 0 19 0 29 0 13
Ukraine 0 0:3 n.a. n.a. 0 0
Poland n.a. n.a. 0 0:3 0 0
EU15 14 0 14 0 14 0
Japan 4:7 0 4:7 0 4:7 0
Canada 0:5 0 0:5 0 0:5 0
Table 7 indicates that, no matter which stable coalition is considered, the EU15 loses
about 14 BUS$/yr by standing alone. The ￿gures for Japan and Canada are consider-
ably lower. If any of these buyers leaves, costs for the remaining Parties are zero. If
Russia were to drop out of the coalition, it would always earn nothing, but the cost incre-
ment for the coalition partners depends very much on which stable structure has formed.
If, looking at the one where Poland is not a member (#19), the remaining agents incur
19 BUS$/yr in costs. Given the stable coalition without the Ukraine, the corresponding
14￿gure is 29, while for the grand coalition it is 13 BUS$/yr.
So which coalition appears most likely to be formed, and how much should Russia
be expected to earn? It is clear that side payments of zero support any stable coalition,
and this can therefore be seen as a minimum possible transfer level. Furthermore, it
appears that Russia should not be able to demand more than 13 BUS$/yr, since it would
be cheaper for the buyers to pay a nonmember (either the Ukraine or Poland) to join.
Thus, we believe more strongly in the formation of the grand coalition than the other
coalitions, at least when it comes to determining realistic levels of the side payments that
may befall Russia. The result is a payment of some amount between 0 and 13 BUS$/yr
(in total) from the EU15, Japan and Canada to Russia.
It is worth noting that the payments by the buyers in a stable coalition are consider-
ably smaller than in the benchmark case of no coalitions (where annual costs were roughly
21, 11 and 5 BUS$, see Table 2). Russia has the potential to earn a great deal more,
while the Ukraine and Poland earn less. This is because of their lack of importance since
they are not both needed for costs to vanish.
4.4 Extension 1: The commitment period reserve rule
Until now, we have ignored the fact that the Parties of the Protocol have agreed on the
so-called commitment period reserve rule, which limits the amount of permits a Party
can sell. Clearly such constraints may a⁄ect our results. The rule, which was written
into the Marrakesh Accords and ￿nally adopted in Montreal in 2005, states (UNFCCC
(2001) p. 99) that: ￿Each Party ... shall maintain in its national registry a commitment
period reserve which should not drop below 90 per cent of the Party￿ s assigned amount,
... or 100 per cent of its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest.￿The term
￿assigned amount￿corresponds to what we have called endowment. Concerning the term
￿recently￿ , we follow the approach in Godal and Klaassen (2006) and suppose that this
amounts to the emissions in the year 2005, denoted by ￿ xi. This chosen lag is due to the
fact that producing an emissions inventory (and having it reviewed) takes several years.
Given these interpretations, the commitment period reserve rule can then be included in
the model by conditioning problems (1), (2) and (3) on the constraint
xi ￿ min[0:9ei; ￿ xi] (4)
for each i 2 F, i 2 C and i 2 S￿C, respectively. This constraint says that the number
of permits an agent holds cannot be lower than what must be kept in the reserve.
We did not include this rule in all the simulations, since we wanted to have a clean
picture of the key driving forces. However, for our stable coalitions given in Table 6, the
rule does not become binding for any Parties and therefore has no e⁄ect.
4.5 Extension 2: The enlarged EU as a single agent
So far, we have treated Poland and other more recent members of the EU as outsiders to
the EU, since they are not part of the EU agreement to comply jointly with the Protocol.
15Suppose instead that the enlarged EU comes forward as a single strategic agent.21 How
would such an arrangement a⁄ect coalition formation? Notice that this change does not
only alter the player set in the noncooperative game, but also the price function, since
many small new EU members were previously supposed to be price-takers. However, the
EU is still a buyer of permits in all scenarios, and the fringe is still a net seller.
With these changes, the following results are obtained.
1. In the benchmark case (￿ve-strategist noncooperative oligopoly), the EU25 has
to pay signi￿cantly less (8 BUS$/yr) because of the inclusion of permit-abundant
countries. Canada and Japan are much worse o⁄, incurring total costs of 7 and 15
BUS$. These countries lose more because the price is higher (88 US$/tC), which
is due to a more concentrated seller side and e¢ cient sharing between the EU25
countries, leaving fewer permits for sale on the open market. Russia and the Ukraine
are slightly better o⁄ than in the benchmark case with six strategists.
2. Concerning pro￿table mergers, a two-party coalition between Russia and the Ukraine
is still not bene￿cial (recall Poland is now part of the EU25, so this is a seller￿ s
monopoly). The same does not hold if any two of the buyers form a coalition: if the
EU25 and Japan were to cooperate, they force prices down and obtain an e¢ cient
distribution of permits between themselves. The latter e⁄ect is very important,
which can be seen from the fact that Canada, bene￿ting from the price reduction,
does not win nearly as much as the coalition (0.8 vs. 2.6 BUS$/yr). In contrast, a
coalition between Canada and the EU25 or Japan is only marginally bene￿cial, and
the outsider (Japan or the EU25, respectively) wins considerably more than the
coalition. In these two latter cases, the ￿merger paradox￿thus prevails. A coali-
tion between all buyers is also bene￿cial. All other two-party coalitions (between a
seller and a buyer) reduce aggregate costs of the coalition partners, with Russia and
Japan forming the most bene￿cial one at a net annual cost reduction of 15 BUS$.
3. As it turns out, and as would be expected from the previous analysis, there are two
internally and externally stable coalitions: the coalition formed by all strategists,
and the coalition formed by all strategists except the Ukraine. In all cases, the total
costs society-wide are zero, and the commitment period reserve rule, constraint (4),
does not bind any Party.
4. Focusing on the grand coalition, for reasons discussed before, if Russia leaves this
coalition, the coalition stands to lose a little less than 13 BUS$/yr. If the EU25
leaves, it loses 6.5 BUS$/yr. If Japan exits, the coalition partners win a little (be-
cause they are sellers and the price increases above zero), but Japan loses severely.
The net annual cost increase of all the coalition partners is nearly 14 BUS$/yr. If
Canada exits, the loss is some 5 BUS$/yr. The Ukraine earns nothing outside the
coalition, and the rest of the strategists have access to enough quotas without the
Ukraine.
21That is, it includes the EU15 plus Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia and Slovenia. The abbreviation EU25 is used, even though the two remaining new countries,
Malta and Cyprus, are not included in the model.
16Under the assumption that all EU25 countries behave as a single strategic player under
the Protocol, we have thus found that the EU stands to pay a maximum of 6.5 BUS$/yr,
which is considerably less than when it came forward as the EU15. Russia is not much
a⁄ected by such an enlargement of the EU15, but Japan and Canada clearly are: they
stand to pay (to Russia) a maximum of 14 and 5 BUS$/yr, respectively. Interpreting
these maximum payments as an (inverse) indication of the countries￿bargaining power,
it seems clear that Canada and Japan should try to prevent such EU coordination. Their
success depends on the interpretation of Article 4 (it is the EU15 that has signed the
agreement to be treated as a single party under the Protocol) and/or the willingness and
ability of the EU25 countries to trade at marginal costs among themselves. The latter
could involve some substantial ￿xed transfers from the old to the new EU countries, most
notably Poland. Thus, the inclusion of the new EU countries as a single partner under the
Kyoto Protocol could potentially come forward as a controversial issue not only between
the large Kyoto partners, but also within the EU.
5 Some ￿nal remarks
This paper studied cartel formation in the permit market under the Kyoto Protocol. Our
main ￿ndings can be summarized as follows.
1. Gains from cooperation are much larger when sellers and buyers join up (such
as Russia and the EU) than if Parties on the same side of the market cooperate
(like Russia and the Ukraine). The latter is typically unpro￿table, and, somewhat
surprisingly, this even holds when all large sellers cooperate.
2. A stable coalition can be formed by as few as ￿ve Parties, viz., Russia, the EU15,
Japan, Canada and either the Ukraine or Poland.
3. To uphold this cartel, no side payments need to be made, but it could involve a
transfer to Russia of up to 13 BUS$/yr, which is paid by the EU15, Japan and
Canada.
4. A stable cartel induces the overall Pareto-e¢ cient outcome with a vanishing permit
price and no emission reductions.
A few of many limitations to this study are worth noting. First, our parameters do not
include noncarbon greenhouse gases, the Clean Development Mechanism (the possibility
to reduce emissions in countries without binding commitments) or forestation. However,
it is worth noting that studies encompassing these items, generally ￿nd that prices and
costs are lowered by these options (Springer, 2003). Since we ￿nd that the prices and
costs in our equilibrium coalitions are zero, we feel that these additional considerations
may not be of paramount importance to our results. The unpro￿tability of seller (and
other) coalitions rests on di⁄erences in costs more than on absolute costs, and appear, as
such, more immune towards omitted items that simply bring costs down.
Another shortcoming is the lack of bargaining costs. However, since incentives to
cooperate are in the range of a hundred million to several billion US$ per year, we believe
17that omitting such costs in our model should not prove detrimental. A potentially more
important weakness, is the fact that our model is static and does not allow for the
possibility that permits can be saved for later periods. Permit banking is legal under the
Kyoto Protocol, and may seem a likely scenario since the price we calculate in equilibrium
is nil. That, of course, does not imply that permits have no value in equilibrium, since they
generate transfers that could be substantial. The e⁄ect on permit prices with banking,
but without coalition formation, is discussed in Godal and Klaassen (2006) and could,
in principle, be added to an extended model. On a more general note, it also appears
that other solution concepts for the second-stage noncooperative permit market could be
envisaged. To this end, the material in Gabszewicz (2002) may turn out to be useful.
Finally, re￿ ecting on the Kyoto Protocol setting, there is no apparent legal hurdle for
governments to form coalitions. On the contrary, such arrangements are even encour-
aged. There is however no immediately identi￿able body that has the power to enforce
such agreements should that be necessary. The possible implications of any breaches of
agreements, could also be an interesting topic for further study.
18APPENDIXA
The functional forms and parameters of the cost functions applied in the simulations
were derived from simulation data provided by the International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, in 2001. These data were extracted from the
MERGE model (see Manne and Richels (1992) for a general description of MERGE, and
www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/ for more recent information). In essence, MERGE
(A Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global E⁄ects of Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Policies), is an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model with a more detailed
representation of the energy sector (the prime source of greenhouse gas emissions) than
the remainder of the economy. Only the energy-related CO2 emissions were accounted
for in the applied version of MERGE, which was calibrated to the so-called B2 emissions
scenario made for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Nakicenovic and
Swart (2000)).
By imposing various levels of a global carbon tax in MERGE for the year 2010 and
computing the resulting emissions, marginal emission cost functions were derived by
simple OLS regression. The marginal emission costs were well approximated by linear
functions for taxes in the range 0 to 250 US$/tC.
Since some agents have an excess of permits, costs must also be speci￿ed when keeping




2bi(bixi ￿ ai)2 when xi ￿ ai=bi
0 when xi > ai=bi;
(5)
for all i 2 I, where ai; bi > 0. It is clear from (5) that costs are once continuously
di⁄erentiable, but not twice; nor strictly decreasing or strictly convex everywhere.
The level of aggregation of countries in MERGE is completely unsatisfactory for the
purpose of this study. For the Parties that have rati￿ed the Kyoto agreement, MERGE
uses the aggregation: 1) Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, 2) OECD Europe, 3)
Canada, New Zealand and Australia (which has not rati￿ed) and 4) Japan. By making
use of the emissions in 1990 given on a country basis by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (http:nnunfccc.int), country-speci￿c marginal cost func-
tions were constructed on the basis of requiring that the emissions of a MERGE region
would equal the sum of the emissions of the countries in that region, given any common
marginal cost.
One should note that this procedure for splitting MERGE aggregates will neglect
any heterogeneity beyond size emissions-wise. In other words, the disaggregation is done
in such a way that for any permit price (carbon tax), the price elasticity of demand
(emissions) is equal for all countries being part of a speci￿c group, and of course also
equal to what was found using MERGE for that particular group. To achieve this, the
marginal cost functions have the same intercepts but di⁄erent slopes. Heterogeneities
that are left out may be important, in particular for countries with small emissions. The
reader should therefore not put too much emphasis on the results for those countries.
The endowments of permits under the Kyoto Protocol are de￿ned as a percentage
change of the emissions in the year 1990 for each party. To compute the endowments,
19the 1990 emissions level given by MERGE (so as to obtain the same emissions coverage
as for the cost functions) were combined with the required reduction percentages given in
the Kyoto agreement. These MERGE aggregate endowments where then disaggregated
according to the national 1990 emission levels. The parameters of the cost functions and
the computed endowments are given in Table A1.
Table A1. The parameters used in the numerical analysis. ￿Proj. rev. em.￿ is an abbre-
viation for ￿projected reviewed emissions￿ , which are used to determine commitment period
reserves.
Cost function parameters Endowment Proj. rev. em.
Units Marg. costs measured in US$/tC MtC/yr MtC/yr
Symbol ai bi ei ￿ xi
Canada 693 3.7 123 172
New Zealand 693 67.2 7 9
Bulgaria 1410 77.0 25 18
Czech Rep. 1410 39.1 51 35
Estonia 1410 171.0 11 8
Hungary 1410 90.4 22 15
Latvia 1410 261.0 7 5
Lithuania 1410 164.0 12 8
Poland 1410 17.0 116 81
Romania 1410 37.5 51 37
Russia 1410 2.7 768 503
Slovakia 1410 104.0 19 13
Slovenia 1410 465.0 4 3
Ukraine 1410 9.2 228 149
Japan 1730 4.9 258 324
Iceland 1880 2880.0 1 1
Norway 1880 176.0 10 10
Switzerland 1880 139.0 11 13
EU15 1880 1.9 839 974
20APPENDIXB
This appendix explains how the model was solved numerically. For each given coalition
structure, C, an equilibrium to the second-stage game was searched for. The nonnegativ-
ity constraints on xi;i 2 I; played no role in the simulations. Therefore, the Kuhn￿ Tucker
conditions to problems (1)-(3) amount to
c0
i (xi) + p = 0 for each i 2 F;
c0
i (xi) + p + p0 P
i2C(xi ￿ ei) = 0 for each i 2 C;
c0
i (xi) + p + p0(xi ￿ ei) = 0 for each i 2 S￿C; P
i xi ￿
P
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As hinted at in section 2, these necessary conditions may not be su¢ cient since noncon-
vexities cannot be ruled out. However, this is not the only problem, as it turns out that
the objective functions in (2)-(3) are not continuously di⁄erentiable. This is because the















i2F ^ xi , p > 0
0 when Q >
P
i2F ^ xi , p = 0;
(7)
where the ￿nite number
^ xi := minfxi : ci (xi) = 0g (8)
is what is called the ￿business-as-usual￿emission level (see also Table 1). However with
our data, P is not di⁄erentiable at Q = ^ Q :=
P
i2F ^ xi, which, in fact is a typical supply of
permits in equilibrium. Thus, our second-stage game does not satisfy the di⁄erentiability
assumption of the Kuhn￿ Tucker Theorem.22
To explain how we dealt with these problems, consider ￿rst our main case when the
EU comes forward as EU15. The inverse permit supply function for the fringe (as an
aggregate) then becomes as depicted in Figure B1.
22Although nonsmooth problems may be regularized by using techniques as given in Clarke et al.
(1998), the additional insight that we can obtain by going through such an exercise would still be rather
limited since smoothness does not help to rule out nonconvexities. Hence, a ￿rst-order equilibrium would
still not automatically be a Nash equilibrium.
21Figure B1. Inverse permit supply when the EU15 comes forward as a single agent. The price is
US$/tC, the quantity is MtC/yr.
At p = 693 the supply curve kinks again, but p > 693 plays no role in our analysis
since all agents have lower marginal abatement costs in autarchy than 458 US$/tC. The
number 49 on the horizontal axis in Figure B1 depicts the excess quotas of the fringe at
p = 0, and thus, for demand lower than (or equal to) 49 MtC/yr, the price is zero.
Given this supply function by the fringe, we have proceeded as follows.
1. We suppose that in equilibrium p0 = 7:58 (the slope of the supply function for
p > 0), and we use GAMS to search for a candidate Nash equilibrium. Whenever
GAMS returns p > 0; it is argued in step 2 below that the solution is indeed a
Nash equilibrium. This happened in simulations #1-#8 and #10-#18. Whenever
it produces p = 0 we proceed to step 3. This happened in simulations #9 and
#19-#21:
2. If, hypothetically, the p > 0 segment describes the entire relevant supply function,
the problem yields a single Nash equilibrium (Fl￿m and Godal (2005), Theorem 2).
The potential problem lies in the fact that the supply curve is nonlinear, not strictly
decreasing, and has a kink. Now, a seller will clearly not bene￿t from supplying
enough quotas to induce a price p = 0. A buyer can possibly improve the situation
by reducing demand su¢ ciently to induce a price of zero. However, at any proposed
equilibrium where p > 0; a buyer has positive marginal costs. Decreasing purchases
to induce a price of zero increases marginal costs, and it is thus never bene￿cial to
move total demand below 49 MtC. However, one can get arbitrarily close to this
22point along the p > 0 segment, such that any deviation to 49 MtC total demand
should not be bene￿cial. Hence, the candidate from step 1 is a (the only) Nash
equilibrium.
3. When returning p = 0; the calculations also show strategic sellers to be inactive,
because of the (faulty) assumption that p0 > 0: Total demand by the strategists
is also, in all cases, lower than the 49 MtC of the excess quotas that the fringe
possesses. The fact that total demand of 49 MtC is not returned is again due to
the assumption p0 > 0; making buyers restrict purchases (the opposite result would
be merely a coincidence). As long as buyers have positive marginal costs, no such
situation can be part of an equilibrium. The only candidate for an equilibrium will
entail the buyers to purchase all available quotas at p = 0: For p = 0 and p0 = 0;
sellers could also sell more quotas, but if the buyers empty whatever excess quotas
there are onto the market, a strategic seller would reap a ￿rst-order bene￿t from
reducing sales slightly beyond such a level (inducing p > 0): Thus, such a situation
can never be part of an equilibrium. When p = 0 is returned, two possible types of
mutually exclusive equilibria then exist, and they have the following characteristics.
(a) At least one strategic buyer has positive marginal costs, buyers share the excess
quotas of the fringe and sellers are inactive.23 These are characteristics of the
equilibrium presented in simulation #9.
(b) All buyers have zero marginal costs, and the fringe is either emptied while
sellers are inactive, or nonemptied. In the latter case, sales by the sellers
cannot be restricted to push prices above zero (or else it would not be an
equilibrium). This happens in simulations #19￿ #21: In all these cases the
fringe has enough quotas to make buyers reach zero marginal costs. Thus,
multiple equilibria exist because whether the strategic sellers or the fringe
provide the quotas does not matter. Costs are however the same in all cases.
The same type of argument applies for the simulations concerning the enlarged EU,
but the supply function is di⁄erent since some fringe countries are then assumed to be
part of the strategic player EU. However, the fringe is still a net supplier of permits.
23The sharing rule between buyers must also be such that the buyers do not have marginal costs so
high that increasing purchases and inducing a positive price is bene￿cial.
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